

Turkey and Israel in a New Middle East

Karen Kaya

Synopsis: The article analyzes the Turkey-Israel relationship in light of the changing Middle East. It analyzes their operational environments in the aftermath of the Arab Spring, and discusses what the newly restored relationship might look like after three years of frozen relations. It concludes that, while relations might take a long time to be fully repaired; the freeze in diplomatic relations, which created a problem for security coordination, will be overcome.

July 2013

The views expressed in FMSO publications and reports are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

TURKEY AND ISRAEL IN A NEW MIDDLE EAST

Introduction

On 22 March 2013 Turkey and Israel agreed to resume diplomatic ties after an almost three-year freeze in political relations. On that day Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu called Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and apologized for the operational mistakes made during the Mavi Marmara incident in May 2010, during which a Turkish flotilla headed to Gaza was met with an Israeli raid, resulting in the deaths of nine Turkish citizens, including one Turkish-American. The incident caused a severe deterioration in relations, and in February 2011 Turkey cut off diplomatic relations with Israel by announcing that it would not appoint a new Israeli ambassador. With the apology, the two countries are now on a path to resuming cooperation in a number of areas, as they work out the details of reinstating diplomatic relations.¹

On the day of the apology Netanyahu posted on his Facebook page: “After three years of disconnect in Israel-Turkey relations, I decided it was time to rebuild them. The changing reality around us requires us to constantly re-examine our relationship with the countries in the region.”²

“The changing reality around us” that Netanyahu was referring to had to do with the massive changes that have taken place in the Middle East in the last three years. In fact, not just Israel and Turkey, but also the entire region is regrouping in the face of the Arab revolutions, the Syrian crisis, and the developments in Egypt, which saw the rise and subsequent removal of the Muslim Brotherhood, with potentially dangerous consequences for the region. Meanwhile Iran continues its nuclear weapons program, jihadists have emerged in Syria and Iraq is becoming increasingly unstable. Both Iraq and Syria face the risk of breaking up along sectarian fault lines.

Consequently, relations between Israel and Turkey are at a critical juncture, not only due to their bilateral relations, but also because of the new geopolitical realities in the Middle East. As Turkey and Israel start to restore ties, the question arises as to what kind of relationship this will be, given their changing operational environments. During the time that relations were frozen, this posed a challenge to security cooperation, because intelligence sharing and combined military exercises, including those that involved trilateral exercises with the U.S., were also hindered, and Turkey vetoed Israel’s participation in NATO activities. Despite the apology, it will take a long time for diplomatic relations to be repaired. When they are, they will more likely go back to the cool status of relations during the period before the May 2010 incident, as opposed to the close cooperation of the 1990s. However, the freeze in relations, which created a problem for security coordination, will be overcome, and that is an important step.³

It is important to note that Turkish-Israeli relations had started taking a turn for the worse before the May 2010 flotilla incident, even though they were not frozen. Two incidents stand out as significant in the downward spiral of Turkish-Israeli relations prior to May 2010. Israel’s Operation Cast Lead, the Israeli offensive against Hamas in the winter of

2008-2009 in late 2008 through early 2009 damaged relations significantly. The Turkish side reacted very harshly, calling Israel's actions a crime against humanity. Coming at a time when Erdoğan had been personally involved in attempts to mediate between Israel and Syria, he felt personally betrayed by Israeli Prime Minister Olmert and escalated his anti-Israeli remarks. He said, "At a time when we have been working so hard for peace, the fact that Israel has chosen this path is a severe blow to peace and peace initiatives... Today, I was thinking of calling Prime Minister Olmert to discuss Israel-Syria negotiations, but now I have cancelled that and I won't be calling him. Because this is a disrespectful move against us."⁴ Shortly after this, during the World Economic Forum in Davos in January 2009, Erdoğan walked out of a debate with Israeli President Shimon Peres, after accusing him of "knowing very well how to kill."⁵ In October of that year Turkey declared that Israel would not participate in the multinational military exercise "Anatolian Eagle"; all military cooperation between Turkey and Israel has been suspended since then. This was the atmosphere in relations during the period leading up to the flotilla incident.

Since February 2011, when Turkey cut off diplomatic relations with Israel, analysts in both Turkey and Israel have tried to predict the future shape of Turkish-Israeli relations. In Israel, some claimed that, given the changing realities of the region, Israel should apologize, move on and re-establish dialogue with Turkey;⁶ others claimed that doing so would only embolden Erdoğan and his anti-Israel rhetoric. They claimed that Turkey under Erdoğan, with its

Islamist tendencies, was inherently anti-Israel, and therefore no reconciliation could ever take place as long as Erdoğan was in power in Turkey.⁷ Others noted that while the Erdoğan government was strongly pro-Palestinian, it was also pragmatic enough to see that the two countries now shared common concerns about Syria and Iranian influence in the region.⁸

It appears that overlapping strategic interests within the changing realities in the region pushed both sides to act pragmatically. What were these strategic considerations that made reconciliation possible?

Billboard in Ankara. Top caption reads: Mr. Prime Minister; we are GRATEFUL that you let our country experience this pride. Bottom caption reads: Israel APOLOGIZED to TURKEY...



Source: Haberturk.com.tr

The New Middle East

In the last three years the Arab awakening has shifted the balance of power and brought in new, very different actors. Islamists across the Arab world have gained power. On Israel's southwestern border the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood under President Muhammad Morsi in Egypt, the most populous and critical Arab country, changed the region's balance. His recent removal will have dangerous consequences for the entire region, where, as the *Economist* notes, Islamists may conclude that, "if they win power in elections, their opponents will use non-democratic means to oust them. So if they are allowed to come to office, they will very likely do their damndest to cement their power by fair means or foul. Crush your opponents could well be their motto."⁹ Meanwhile, in November 2012 Palestinians won a diplomatic victory by gaining observer non-member status at the United Nations (UN), enabling them to participate in negotiations in the UN and take part in many other institutions.

Map of the Middle East.



Source: Worldatlas.com

The crisis in Syria, with its spillover effects, border violations and refugee crises has affected the entire region. Syria's neighbors have all had to deal with instability at their borders. The humanitarian dimension alone directly affects Turkey, Egypt, Iraq, Lebanon, and Jordan, who as of July 2013, host a total of approximately 1,600,000 refugees.¹⁰ The crisis has also deepened divisions in the region along Sunni and Shi'ite lines; it has forced Hizbullah to prepare for contingencies involving no Syrian support; and the Kurds are planting the seeds for an autonomous Kurdish region adjacent to the one in Iraq, causing strategic and security concerns for all neighboring countries.

Moreover, Syria is increasingly becoming a breeding ground for Islamic militants. The emergence of the al-Qaeda-linked al Nusrah Front in Syria and the discovery of the use of chemical weapons have caused great concern that such weapons may fall into the hands of terrorist groups like the al Nusrah Front, Hizbullah or the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), whose Syrian contingent controls parts of the Turkey-Syria border.¹¹

Shortly after the Palestinians gained non-member observer status in the UN, the Israel-Gaza conflict revealed that Hamas now had the capability of making (or acquiring) rockets that could reach as far as Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, nearly 50 miles from the Gaza Strip. In response, Israel's new "Iron Dome" missile defense system was tested and proved highly effective in fending off most of the missiles. The incident also highlighted that Egypt, not Turkey, had the ability to mediate such a conflict, and Turkey realized it could not play an active role as long as it was not talking to Israel.

The Operational Environments of Turkey and Israel

Following the break with Turkey and the subsequent Arab revolts, Israel found itself further isolated and surrounded by major threats.¹² Previously, Egypt under Mubarak supported the peace process and Israel also had the support of Turkey. In the aftermath of the Arab revolutions, two immediate borders for Israel have become vulnerable to non-state actors: jihadi movements and Hamas in Sinai (its border with Egypt) and al-Qaeda linked groups in the Golan Heights (its border with Syria). Thus, reconciliation with Turkey serves several Israeli interests. The main threat to Israel, the possibility of Syria's stockpile of chemical weapons reaching militant groups bordering Israel, necessitates sharing intelligence with Turkey on the issue of Syrian border security and cooperating with NATO. This is a concern that Turkey also shares.

In Israel's neighborhood there is a real possibility of descent into war. Both Egypt and Syria's futures are uncertain. The future government of Egypt may or may not uphold Egypt's peace treaty with Israel. The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, a disciplined ideological movement that calls for the destruction of Israel, will continue to be a strong force, even if they are not in power. Alarmists argue that confrontation with Iran is a real possibility as Iran gets closer and closer to the red lines drawn by Israeli PM Netanyahu.¹³ The situation in Syria has turned into a proxy war between Assad's allies Iran, Iraq, Russia, and Hizbullah against Turkey, Qatar, and Western countries that support the opposition. Whether Syria stays intact or not, it is possible, even likely that the new leader(s), will also have an ideological disposition, and possibly the will, to militarily engage Israel. This is the new Middle East reality for Israel. On the issue of Syria, Israel and Turkey share a preference for a unified, stable, moderate and democratic Syria to emerge.¹⁴

Israel realizes that Turkey will play a big role in the new Middle East. In addition, exclusion from NATO activities due to its break in relations with Turkey, and Israel's loss of Turkey as a military partner (Israeli pilots used to train over Turkish airspace) created problems for Israel's military readiness and standing among modern militaries.

Turkey for its part needs Israel's intelligence and military cooperation. Michael Koplow, program director of the Israel Institute writes in *Foreign Affairs*:

Turkey cannot afford to have chemical weapons used anywhere near its border with Syria, and the longer the fighting goes on, the greater the chances of a chemical weapons strike gone awry. Israel simply has better intelligence on regional developments than Turkey does, and Turkey can use that help to monitor Assad's weapons stores and troop movements on both sides. ... As the situation in Syria heats up, Turkey and Israel will be thankful that they can talk to each other and coordinate.¹⁵

Changing Turkish Foreign and Security Policy

In the aftermath of the Arab revolts, Turkey's relations with Iran also became even more problematic due to Turkey's position regarding the Syrian crisis (along with its decision to host a NATO early-warning radar). Turkey, whose leaders had previously been trying to achieve "zero problems with neighbors," (their famous foreign policy objective prior to the Arab Spring) found itself with zero neighbors without problems instead.

On a regional level, Turkey wants to become a leader. In August 2012, at a Turkish Grand National Assembly meeting, Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu said, "No matter what anyone says, Turkey will be the leader and the spokesperson of a new peaceful order in the Middle East."¹⁶ This requires that Turkey have dialogue with all parties in the region, including Israel. As long as relations were frozen, Turkey realized that it could not play such a role. This became particularly clear in the aftermath of the November 2012 Israel-Gaza war, where Egypt was highlighted as the clear mediator and Turkey was sidelined.

Energy security is another factor that motivated both parties to restore ties. Israel has just discovered two major natural gas fields off its coast in the Eastern Mediterranean. Turkey needs some of this natural gas while Israel needs transport lines through Turkey to get this natural gas to international markets.¹⁷ Turkey is currently reliant on Russia and Iran for its energy needs and pays a high price for this. Talks of an extensive gas pipeline deal between Turkey and Israel have been in the works for a while. Such a deal would make Turkey the energy hub it wishes to become, while giving Israel access to markets in Europe, the Middle East, and Central Asia due to Turkey's ideal location.¹⁸

Another important incentive to restore relations is trade. Turkey and Israel signed a free trade agreement in 1996, a double-tax prevention treaty in 1997, and a bilateral investment treaty in 1998, ushering in an era of improving economic ties. Both parties know that if the diplomatic freeze were to translate into a trade crisis, this would take a serious toll on both countries' economies. This can be seen in the fact that trade relations continued to thrive even after the freeze in diplomatic relations. A report by the Washington Institute notes that, "From 2010 to 2011, trade increased by 30.7 percent, far surpassing even the growth during the height of Turkey-Israel ties. In 2011, bilateral trade totaled a record \$4.44 billion."¹⁹ Trade in early 2012 continued well above pre-flotilla levels." Trade still appears to be a tie that binds Turkey and Israel.

Domestically and in the Arab world, Erdoğan benefits from anti-Israel rhetoric. However, it appears that the benefits of reconciling with Israel outweighed the benefits of continuing on with frozen relations.²⁰

Turkey, Israel and the Peace Process

Any discussion of the changing Middle East and Turkish-Israeli relations would be incomplete without a discussion of the peace process. Following the Israeli apology, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry indicated that the U.S. would like to see Turkey play a role in the Middle East peace process. Can Turkey play a role, and, if so, how does its relations with Israel and Hamas factor into this?

Certainly, as a NATO member, a member of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), and a country that borders Iraq, Syria, and Iran—countries that constitute potential shared threats with Israel—Turkey may have a constructive role to play. There are, however, also limits to Turkey's influence in the region. It is true that Turkey has a good relationship with and thus perhaps some leverage over Hamas. But is it realistic to think that Turkey can convince Hamas to accept the conditions set forth by the Quartet (the United States, the European Union, the United Nations, and Russia) to recognize Israel, renounce violence and reconcile with Fatah and the Palestinian Authority? In the past (in April 2011) it was Egypt, not Turkey that managed to achieve any agreement between the factions (and this did not last).

High-ranking Turkish officials', particularly Prime Minister Erdoğan's harsh comments against Israel on the part of high-ranking Turkish officials, particularly Prime Minister Erdoğan, have made it difficult for Israel to view Turkey as a credible mediator. It will take a lot of time to rebuild trust on both sides. Trying to get Turkey involved in the peace process before achieving some mutual trust with Israel (and resolving technical issues such as compensation to and lawsuits by the families of the victims of the Mavi Marmara incident) risks being counterproductive to both processes and risks backfiring. This would put the fledgling Turkish-Israeli normalization process at jeopardy.

This poses a predicament, however. A look at the history and ups and downs of the Israeli-Turkish relationship suggests that there is a correlation between progress in the peace process and these relations. Due to Turkey's historical and religious ties with the Palestinians, Turkey is able to maintain good relations with Israel at those times when there is at least some forward progress in negotiations or a peace process. In contrast, strained relations between Israel and the Palestinians drive a wedge between Turkey and Israel. Then it is difficult for the Turkish government to justify its engagement with Israel to its base. Consequently, in these circumstances Turkey takes a critical line against Israel, siding with the Palestinians. This determines how vigorously Turkish politicians attack Israel, and how the Turkish media report Israeli attacks on the Palestinians, but rarely extends to Hamas terrorist attacks against Israel.²¹

This has been even more evident since 2002. The Justice and Development Party's (AKP) efforts to position Turkey as a regional leader via engagement with its Muslim neighbors require Turkey to play up its Muslim identity in an effort to have a common denominator with the Muslim population in the region. Thus, almost every time Israel exchanges fire in Gaza, Turkey distances itself from Israel and sides with the Palestinians, often by vehemently criticizing Israel. Somewhat ironically, Turkey's efforts to emerge as a regional leader have limited its ability to play a balanced role, not to mention its ability to be a credible mediator in the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.²²

The problem in this relationship is that Turkey and Israel have few common denominators when it comes to the issue of Palestinians, due to Turkey's historical and religious ties to Palestinians. In particular, each time the Palestinian problem unfolds in a

way that involves humanitarian dimensions, the tensions between Israel and Turkey will rise. The flotilla incident is just another reminder of this reality.

Thus, the current situation seems to be a paradoxical one. The predicament is that while Turkish-Israeli ties have to move forward before Turkey can play a role in the Middle East peace process, the Middle East peace process has to move forward before Turkey-Israel ties can improve.

Turkey can contribute to the process by advancing private sector investment projects in the West Bank and Gaza and helping Palestinian economic revitalization and infrastructure development, similar to what it is doing in the Kurdish Regional Government region. Joint economic ventures between the already interconnected Israeli and Turkish private sectors in fields such as telecommunications, pharmaceutical, light industries, and infrastructure can benefit all sides.²³

A Far Cry from the Golden Age of the 1990s

Turkey and Israel began developing security and military relations in the early 1990s. The operational environment that brought them closer took shape with the 1991 Gulf War, which was a particularly important trigger for the rapprochement. Turkey and Israel were on the same page regarding the necessity of the war and their support for the U.S. In addition, the Oslo Peace Process removed a severe stumbling block in Turkish-Israeli relations and created a conducive environment for improved relations.²⁴ The security- and intelligence-based cooperation, which started in the early 90s, was a reflection of the operational environments of each country at the time.

At that time Turkey was fighting a counterinsurgency and counterterrorism war against the PKK. It also faced two hostile neighbors, Iran and Syria, which were supporting the PKK. Thus, the decision to create a “Turkey-Israel axis” was meant as a counterbalance to the “Iran-Syria axis” in the region. In July 1999 the Turkish prime minister’s office declared Turkey’s rapprochement with Israel as having become a necessity due to “Arab nations’ hostile actions towards Turkey, and their allegiance to Syria despite Syria’s support to the PKK.”²⁵ From the Israeli side, it was beneficial to establish close relations with Turkey and its military. It enabled Israel to break its isolation in the Middle East, and the Israeli Air Force gained the chance to train in Turkish skies. In addition, The Turkish Armed Forces were in need of modernization, know-how and equipment during the second half of the 1980s, and were in search of new resources. During this time Turkey and Israel started cooperating on air force projects.

In the Cold War period Turkey’s partnership with Israel contributed to its rising influence and weight in the region. Though Arab countries in the region were initially wary of this alliance, eventually they realized that Turkey was not going to use this against Palestinian interest. In time, Arab countries realized that Turkey’s influence over Israel might be something they could use to their advantage and started viewing this alliance in a more positive light.²⁶

In fact, during periods when the peace process stalled, diplomatic traffic towards Ankara would increase, showing that Turkey had an important role to play in talking to Israel. During the difficult days of the Second Intifada, the Palestinian Authority's representative from Jerusalem, Sari Nusseibeh, urged Turkish diplomats to be "soft" with Israel, indicating that Palestinians viewed Turkey as a much-needed player in case things got out of hand, and that they wanted a possible Turkish channel of communication to remain open.

This is no longer the case. AKP's new foreign policy, which required engagement with its Arab neighbors, necessitated a more vocal criticism of Israel and a more sensitive tone to the Palestinian issue. Turkey's new foreign policy of trying to establish itself as a regional leader has required playing up Turkey's Muslim identity in an effort to have common ground with the Arab countries in the region. Israeli military actions against Gaza indirectly undermine Turkey's leadership role, since it forces Turkey to distance itself from Israel and side with the Palestinians. Thus, an important aspect of today's Turkish-Israeli relationship is that it is tied to advancement in the peace process.

The Third Party in Turkish-Israeli Relations: The United States

Turkish-Israeli relations have always involved relations with the United States. Similarly, Israel was always an important dimension of the Turkish-American relationship. Until recently, Turkey considered that good relations with Israel were necessary for it to have good relations with the United States. As a report by the Turkish Foundation for Social, Economic and Political Research (SETA) notes, "Turkey thought the road to Washington required a detour through Jerusalem, a perception strengthened by the U.S. preference that Turkey purchase the latest military and equipment from Israel."²⁷

One of the reasons that Turkey was eager to have good relations with Israel was the recognition of a strong pro-Israel lobby in U.S. domestic politics. Turkey did not have a powerful lobby to represent its interests in Congress, and good relations with Israel gave Turkey a needed strong lobby.

Today, this is no longer the case. The Turkish leadership ~~appears to believe~~ that it has come to maintain its own importance with the U.S. without having good relations with Israel. Turkey now views itself as an important player in its own right, especially after September 11, 2001, because of its secular, Muslim, modern and capitalist identity. Erdoğan's actions suggest that he believes he does not need the pro-Israel lobby in the U.S. based on Turkey's new *intrinsic* importance to the U.S. Currently, Turkey manages its relations with Israel and the U.S. on separate tracks and does not feel obliged to compromise on its relations with Israel to please Washington.²⁸

In the past, security and military cooperation between Turkey and Israel also led to the formation of trilateral relations among Turkey, Israel and the United States. In addition to the cooperation in intelligence gathering, the three countries launched numerous security cooperation programs, including military drills in the Mediterranean Sea (e.g.,

Reliant Mermaid, known in Turkey as Anatolian Eagle).²⁹ When relations between Turkey and Israel stalled, this made things difficult for the U.S. too. For example, in the fall of 2009 the Turkish military canceled a planned joint exercise with the Israel Air Force, which was to also include US, Italian and NATO forces.³⁰

Turkey's frozen relations with Israel hindered NATO intelligence-sharing and even missile defense efforts. Israel was cut out of certain NATO operations, as Turkey, a member country, vetoed Israeli participation at every opportunity.³¹ Turkey allegedly blocked Israel's participation in the May 2012 Chicago NATO summit (Israel is a member of the Mediterranean Dialogue, an outreach program to seven non-NATO states), attracting criticism from the Alliance that it was bringing its bilateral problems into NATO. Meanwhile, some in Israel called on NATO to reject Turkey's veto, claiming that its Western allies had allowed the Alliance to be "hijacked" by the growing anti-Israeli stance of NATO's sole Muslim member.³²

In addition, when Turkey was asked to host the NATO missile defense radar shield, it agreed to do so only on the condition that the data not be shared with Israel. In February 2012 Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu said that Turkey would never allow Israel to use any NATO facility.

The rift between Turkey and Israel exposed an important area of divergence between Turkey and the U.S. Following the Gaza crisis of November 2012, there was a fundamental incompatibility in the Middle East policies of Turkey and the U.S. During this crisis Turkey felt that the U.S. viewed the cause of the fighting in Gaza as Hamas's continuing firing of rockets at Israel, and that the Israeli bombardments were part of Israel's right to defend itself. Ankara's assessment of the Gaza events were very different than those of the U.S. and the West in general. Erdoğan blamed Israel for the entire incident and stood behind Hamas. In contrast to the U.S. and European view of Hamas as a terrorist organization, Erdoğan called Israel a "terrorist state."³³

The U.S. appeared to deal with the situation by managing its relations with the two countries on separate tracks. As Henri Barkey writes in *The National Interest*, "The Obama administration tried very hard to manage this difficult set of relations between its two allies simply by compartmentalizing its approach to them."³⁴ Thus, the reinstatement of relations between Turkey and Israel is a long-awaited and welcome development for the U.S., which worked hard to make it happen (the apology call happened during the last minutes of a March 2013 visit to Israel by President Obama).

Going Forward: What Will the Relationship Look Like?

Many believe that the Israeli apology to Turkey will immediately ease strained relations between the two countries. However, with all that has happened, it appears unlikely that the relations will return to what they were in the 1990s. At that time the Turkish military, which had a large say in foreign policy, supported Turkish-Israeli relations. Today, the military no longer has a say in Turkey's foreign policy.

Both sides appear cautious, and the loss of mutual trust will take time to reconcile. A realistic analysis would suggest that the future of the Turkish-Israeli relationship would be a new, unique, and different kind of relationship, but not quite normalization. One Israeli analyst calls it a “cold normalization.”³⁵

It will likely have a strong security component because both countries face a weak, failed, and unstable state in Syria, where chemical weapons can fall into the hands of rogue groups like Hizbullah. As discussed earlier, the two countries are going to have to talk to each other on how to secure their borders.

The anti-Israeli rhetoric from Erdoğan will likely continue and there will be strong public fights due to their continued differences of opinion regarding Hamas. Moreover, statements by Prime Minister Erdoğan after the apology made it clear that, under the current circumstances, the relationship would revert to its pre-Mavi Marmara and post-Operation Cast Lead status, which was tense and cold.³⁶

There will also likely be a strong commercial/trade element, which has always been an important part of the relationship. In fact, despite the fact that military and diplomatic ties have been frozen since 2010, commercial ties were not downgraded. The free trade agreement that was signed in 1996 has been in place the entire time. Trade between the two countries has thrived and business communities remain committed to good ties and to not allow the diplomatic crisis to translate into a crisis in trade.

The one issue that can derail the rapprochement process is the Palestinian issue. Any renewed fighting between Israel and the Palestinians would deal a heavy blow to reconciliation between Turkey and Israel and put the U.S. back in a difficult situation between two of its allies in the Middle East.³⁷

NOTES

¹ Source: Michael J. Koplow, "Why Israel and Turkey Got Back Together," Foreign Affairs.com, 23 March 2013, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139076/michael-j-koplow/why-israel-and-turkey-got-back-together?page=show>

² Kılıç Buğra Kanat, "Turkish-Israeli Rest: Business As Usual?" Middle East Policy, Vol. XX, No. 2, Summer 2013.

³ Henri J. Barkey, "The Apology Heard 'Round the World," The National Interest, 2 April 2013, <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/the-apology-heard-round-the-world-8294>

⁴ "Bize Karşı Saygısızlık (Disrespect for Us)," *Hürriyet*, 28 December 2008.

⁵ "Davos'ta Gerilim (Tension in Davos)," *Hürriyet*, 30 January 2009.

⁶ See, "Israel should apologize to the Turkish people," Haaretz, 24 July 2011, <http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/opinion/israel-should-apologize-to-the-turkish-people-1.374917>; and "Barak: We must apologize for flotilla errors," Ynetnews.com, 29 July 2011, <http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4101703,00.html>

⁷ "Israel's apology to Turkey was a mistake," Jerusalem Post, 27 March 2013, <http://www.jpost.com/Opinion/Op-Ed-Contributors/Israels-apology-to-Turkey-was-a-mistake-307895>

⁸ Mustafa Akyol, "Progress for Turkey, Israel and the U.S." The New York Times, 27 March 2013, <http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2013/03/27/what-can-obama-accomplish-in-the-middle-east/progress-for-turkey-israel-and-the-us>

⁹ "Egypt's tragedy," The Economist, 6 July 2013, <http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21580462-muhammad-morsi-was-incompetent-his-ouster-should-be-cause-regret-not-celebration-egypts>

¹⁰ "Syria Regional Refugee Response: Demographic Data of Registered Population," The United Nations Refugee Agency, 11 July, 2013, <http://data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/regional.php>

¹¹ "Spy agencies fear terror groups could get chemical weapons in Syria," Telegraph.co.uk, 10 July 2013, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/10171890/Spy-agencies-fear-terror-groups-could-get-chemical-weapons-in-Syria.html>

¹² "Arab Spring and its Effect of Turkey's Regional Policy," Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research, December 2011.

¹³ "PM: Iran hasn't reached 'red line' in nuke program," The Jerusalem Post, 29 April 2013, <http://www.jpost.com/Diplomacy-and-Politics/PM-Iran-has-not-reached-red-line-in-its-nuclear-program-311453>

¹⁴ Dennis Ross and Moran Stern, “The Role of Syria in Israeli-Turkish Relations,” The Georgetown Journal of International Affairs, July 2013, <http://journal.georgetown.edu/2013/07/26/the-role-of-syria-in-israeli-turkish-relations-by-moran-stern-dennis-ross/>

¹⁵ Source: Michael J. Koplow, “Why Israel and Turkey Got Back Together,” Foreign Affairs.com, 23 March 2013, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139076/michael-j-koplow/why-israel-and-turkey-got-back-together?page=show>

¹⁶ “Ortadoğu’da barış sürecinin öncüsü de sözcüsü de biziz (We are the leader and the spokesperson for the peace process in the Middle East),” Stargazete.com, 28 August 2012, <http://www.stargazete.com/politika/ortadoguda-baris-surecinin-ocusu-de-sozcusu-de-biziz/haber-555139>

¹⁷ Christopher Coats, “What does an Israel-Turkey Awakening Mean for Mediterranean Gas?” Forbest.com, 9 April 2013, <http://www.forbes.com/sites/christophercoats/2013/04/09/what-does-an-israel-turkey-awakening-mean-for-mediterranean-gas/>

¹⁸ Israel, America and Turkey: A useful first step, The Economist, 30 March 2013, <http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21574541-warmer-american-relations-israel-help-end-its-turkish-tiff-useful-first>

¹⁹ Soner Çağaptay and Tyler Evans, “The Unexpected Vitality of Turkish-Israeli Trade,” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy Research Note, Number 16, June 2012

²⁰ Source: Michael J. Koplow, “Why Israel and Turkey Got Back Together,” Foreign Affairs.com, 23 March 2013, <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/139076/michael-j-koplow/why-israel-and-turkey-got-back-together?page=show>

²¹ Ofra Bengio, “Altercating Interests and Orientations between Israel and Turkey: A View from Israel,” *Insight Turkey*, Vol.11, No. 2, p.46.

²² Karen Kaya and Moran Stern, “Turkey, the U.S. and the Middle East Peace Process,” Washington Jewish Week, 18 May 2013, <http://washingtonjewishweek.com/turkey-the-u-s-and-the-middle-east-peace-process/>

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Turkey’s relations with Israel had previously been ambivalent because of the Palestine question. The Oslo Peace Process provided the necessary legitimacy for shifting the relationship to one of strategic alignment.

²⁵ “Başbakan’dan Dış Politikaya İnce Ayar (The Prime Minister Calibrates Foreign Policy),” *Milliyet*, 13 July 1999.

²⁶ Gencer Özkan, “Mavi Marmara Bunalımında Sonun Başlangıcına Doğru (Towards the Beginning of the End in the Mavi Marmara Crisis),” *Ortadoğu Analiz (Middle Eastern Analysis)*, September 2010, Vol.2, No.21.

²⁷ “U.S. –Turkey Relations: Arab Spring and the Search for Model Partnership,” Foundation for Political, Economic, and Social Research report, May 2012,
http://file.setav.org/Files/Pdf/20130515122804_setav_dc_perspective_ustun_kanat_us_turkey.pdf

²⁸ “The New Middle East: One Year after the First Flotilla Incident”, Foundation for Political, Economic, and Social Research report, September 2011.

²⁹ Kılıç Buğra Kanat, “Turkish-Israeli Rest: Business As Usual?” Middle East Policy, Vol. XX, No. 2, Summer 2013.

³⁰ “Turkey drops joint drill because of IAF,” The Jerusalem Post, 11 October 2009,
<http://www.jpost.com/Israel/Turkey-drops-joint-drill-because-of-IAF>

³¹ Henri J. Barkey, “The Apology Heard ‘Round the World,” The National Interest, 2 April 2013,
<http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/the-apology-heard-round-the-world-8294>

³² “Türkiye’den İsrail’e Chicago Vetosu (Turkey Vetoes Israel’s Presence at Chicago Meeting),” Stargazete.com, April 23, 2012, <http://www.stargazete.com/dunya/turkiyeden-israile-chicago-vetosu/haber-550053>

³³ “Turkey’s Erdoğan Calls Israel a ‘Terrorist State,’” Reuters.com, 19 November 2012,
<http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/19/us-palestinians-israel-turkey-idUSBRE8AI0FH20121119>

³⁴ Henri J. Barkey, “The Apology Heard ‘Round the World,” The National Interest, 2 April 2013,
<http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/the-apology-heard-round-the-world-8294>

³⁵ Ben Caspit, “Turkey and Israel: Towards a Cold Normalization,” Al-Monitor.com, 7 May 2013, <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/05/turkey-israel-towards-a-cold-normalization.html>

³⁶ Kılıç Buğra Kanat, “Turkish-Israeli Rest: Business As Usual?” Middle East Policy, Vol. XX, No. 2, Summer 2013.

³⁷ Soli Özel, “Özür ve normalleşme (The apology and normalization),” Haberturk.com.tr, 24 March 2013, <http://www.haberturk.com/yazarlar/soli-ozel/830127-ozur-ve-normallesme>